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NOTE
THE RECOGNITION OF SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY IN
NORTH CAROLINA- Hart v. Ivey
INTRODUCTION
The concept of social host1 liability for the acts of intoxicated
guests is more than a century old.2 However, because providing al-
coholic beverages to an able-bodied man was not a tort at common
law,s recovery against the host who supplied the alcohol could only
be had under statute for one injured by an intoxicated guest.4
Courts and legislatures have been slow to impose liability on social
hosts,5 the actual imposition of such liability being a relatively new
development.' Although a trend toward imposing social host liabil-
ity is emerging,' courts have utilized a myriad of legal theories in
recognizing the cause of action.8 In Hart v. Ivey, 9 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court announced its decision to join the current
1. For purposes of this Note, "social host" is defined as one who gratuitously
provides alcoholic beverages and who is not a commercial vendor of alcoholic
beverages.
2. Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E. 73 (Ill. 1889) (declining to impose liability on social
host who provided alcohol to guest who died after being thrown from his horse
while intoxicated).
3. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969).
4. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 554 (1969) (historically such stat-
utes have limited liability to commercial vendors).
5. Carla Kaluznial Smith, Social Host Liability for Injuries Caused by the
Acts of an Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D. L. REv. 445, 471 (1983).
6. Charles G. Popp, Note, Turn Out the Lights; The Party's Over: an Eco-
nomic Analysis of Social Host Liability, 6 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 129, 131 (1988).
7. Anthony DiPadova, Comment, Social Host Liability: Am I My Brother's
Keeper?, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 351, 396 (1986).
8. Marc E. Odier, Social Host Liability: Opening a Pandora's Box, 61 IND.
L.J. 85, 108 (1985).
9. 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992).
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trend and to impose civil liability on a social host for the injuries
caused by his intoxicated guests.10 Prior to Hart v. Ivey, North
Carolina courts had refused to recognize the liability of social hosts
as a possible cause of action,1' insisting that such recognition be-
longed in the realm of the legislature.12 Departing from its prior
policy, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized social host
liability under common law negligence principles in Hart v. Ivey,
holding that a social host is liable when he provides an alcoholic
beverage to an underage social guest who then drives while im-
paired and injures a third party in an automobile collision.'3
This Note will first trace the development of social host liabil-
ity in North Carolina and in other jurisdictions. Second, the Note
will list the positions on social host liability adopted by other juris-
dictions. Finally, this Note will analyze the Hart decision by ex-
plaining the disagreement between the North Carolina Court of
Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court on the rationale to
be employed, and by noting how the stage is now set for further
expansion of social host liability.
THE CASE
In Hart v. Ivey, 1 the plaintiffs Sandra and Roger Hart asked
the North Carolina Supreme Court to recognize a cause of action
under a common law theory of negligence where a social host pro-
vided alcohol to an underage guest who subsequently injured the
plaintiffs while driving a motor vehicle while impaired."5 The de-
fendants hosted a party, charging all male guests two dollars
($2.00) to drink beer. 6 One of the defendant's guests drank alcohol
at the party and became impaired.17 All of the social hosts and the
guest were aged eighteen which is under the legal age for possess-
ing and consuming alcohol in North Carolina. 8 The guest left the
party driving an automobile while still impaired.' On his way
home, the guest drove the automobile across the double yellow line
10. Id.
11. Hart v. Ivey, 102 N.C. App. 583, 594, 403 S.E.2d 914, 921 (1991).
12. Id.
13. Hart, 332 N.C. at 305, 420 S.E.2d at 178.
14. 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992).
15. Id. at 302, 420 S.E.2d at 176.
16. Hart v. Ivey, 102 N.C. App. 583, 584, 403 S.E.2d 914, 916 (1991).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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and collided into plaintiff's oncoming automobile, causing severe
injuries to her.20 Plaintiff's father claimed damages for loss of
consortium. 21
The Plaintiffs alleged that the social host defendants who pro-
vided alcohol to an underage guest were liable for the injuries in-
flicted by that underage guest's impaired driving under two theo-
ries: (1) negligence per se due to violating N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-
302 (1983) which prohibits aiding an underage person purchase or
possess alcoholic beverages; and (2) common law negligence. 2 The
trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.23 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that plaintiffs' com-
plaint stated a cause of action under the negligence per se theory,
but not under the common law negligence theory.2 4 The court rea-
soned that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302 (1983) is a public safety
statute, designed for "the protection of the community at large
from the injurious consequences of contact with an intoxicated
person. '25 The court held that a public safety statute imposes a
specific duty for the protection of others upon a person, 6 and the
violation of such a statute is negligence per se.27 The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court heard defendant's appeal as of right and
granted plaintiffs' petition for discretionary review of the claim
under the common law negligence theory.28 The North Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision on different
grounds. 29 The court- disagreed with the North Carolina Court of
Appeals on the negligence per se theory, finding that "there is no
express purpose of protecting the public from intoxicated persons"
in N.C. GEN. STAT. §18B-302 (1983).30 However, the North Carolina
Supreme Court found for the plaintiffs, holding that plaintiffs as-
serted a cause of action under common law negligence principles,3 1
recognizing for the first time in North Carolina the liability of a
20. Id.
21. Hart, 332 N.C. at 300, 420 S.E.2d at 175.
22. Hart, 102 N.C. App. at 586, 403 S.E.2d at 917.
23. Hart, 332 N.C. at 301, 420 S.E.2d at 175.
24. Id., 420 S.E.2d at 175-76.
25. Hart, 102 N.C. App. at 590, 403 S.E.2d at 919 (quoting Hutchens v. Han-
kins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 16, 303 S.E.2d 584, 593 (1983)).
26. Id. at 591, 403 S.E.2d at 920.
27. Id.
28. Hart, 332 N.C. at 301, 420 S.E.2d at 176.
29. Id. at 306, 420 S.E.2d at 178.
30. Id. at 304, 420 S.E.2d at 177.
31. Id.
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social host for the injuries inflicted by his social guest who drove
while impaired.3 2
BACKGROUND
A. Development of Social Host Liability in North Carolina
Prior to Hart v. Ivey, the North Carolina statutes and case law
were devoid of any basis for imposing social host liability." The
imposition of social host liability had been urged on the courts
prior to Hart, but the courts did not feel compelled to recognize
such a cause of action.34 However, as the social climate changed
and the policy toward governing alcohol use tightened, the courts
responded by imposing liability on alcohol providers other than so-
cial hosts, for the torts of their intoxicated consumers."
In Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 7 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, applying North Carolina negligence principles,
recognized possible liability on the part of an employer who pro-
vided alcohol to its employees who then drove while intoxicated,
injuring a third party.38 The court was quick to point out that Lit-
ton, the employer, was not a purely social host because it was not
simply entertaining its employees, but was furthering a business
purpose by improving working relationships.39 Because Litton was
not acting as a social host, thus precluding the motion for sum-
mary judgment, Litton's actions were governed by North Carolina
tort law. Under common law negligence principles, one is negligent
if "a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen
32. Id.
33. Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 304, 420 S.E.2d 174, 177 (1992). See also,
Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 957, 960 (4th Cir. 1982).
34. See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982)
(applying North Carolina common law principles).
35. Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 6, 303 S.E.2d 584, 587 (1983) (not-
ing policy behind amendments to the Safe Roads Act of 1983, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-121 et. seq. (1983)).
36. See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982)
(imposing liability on employer for torts of an employee who became intoxicated
at a company party); Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584 (1983)
(imposing liability on commercial vendor for torts of customer who was intoxi-
cated when he purchased alcohol from vendor); and Freeman v. Finney, 65 N.C.
App. 526, 309 S.E.2d 531 (1983) (imposing liability on vendor for torts of intoxi-
cated minor customer).
37. 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982).
38. Id. at 960.
39. Id.
210 [Vol. 15:207
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that such a result, or some similar injurious result, was probable
under the facts as they existed."' 0 Therefore, a jury could find,
that "Litton was negligent if it failed to exercise ordinary care in
furnishing, or permitting its employees to furnish, alcoholic bever-
ages to [the employee] knowing that he had become intoxicated." 1"
The North Carolina Court of Appeals announced in Hutchens
v. Hankins42 that a commercial vendor can be held liable for the
torts of his intoxicated customer if the customer was sold alcoholic
beverages while intoxicated. 4 The court noted that commercial
vendors are prohibited by statute from selling alcoholic beverages
to one whom the vendor knows or should know is in an intoxicated
condition.44 The court found that the general purposes of the stat-
ute were to protect "the customer from the adverse consequences
of intoxication" and to protect "the community from the possible
injurious consequences of contact with the intoxicated person.' 45
The court concluded that a jury could find the vendor negligent
since the statute imposed a duty furthering public safety and vio-
lation of a public safety statute is a per se violation of that duty.'6
Applying similar reasoning in Freeman v. Finney,47 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals again extended vendor liability. In the
Freeman case, the vendor had sold beer to minors in violation of a
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-8 which makes it a crime for any person to
knowingly sell or give malt beverages to any person under eighteen
years of age.48 The minors drank the beer, became intoxicated,
drove a car, and fatally injured a third party in a head-on colli-
sion.49 The vendor was under a statutory duty not to sell alcohol to
minors so as to protect the minors as well as to protect the public
from the minors." By breaching the statutory duty, the vendor
created an unreasonable risk of harm, and was negligent per se.5'
The court expressed its readiness to impose liability for automobile
40. Id. at 961.
41. Id. at 962.
42. 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584 (1983).
43. Id.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-34 (1988).
45. Id. at 16, 303 S.E.2d at 593.
46. Id.
47. 65 N.C. App. 526, 309 S.E.2d 531 (1983).
48. Id. at 528, 309 S.E.2d at 532.
49. Id. at 527, 309 S.E.2d at 531.
50.-/d.
51. Id.
19931
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accidents caused by the negligence of intoxicated minors on the
vendors from whom the minors purchased alcohol.52
B. Development of Common Law Negligence Social Host Liabil-
ity In Other Jurisdictions
The Oregon Supreme Court was the first court to impose so-
cial host liability in Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau
Omega Fraternity,53 a case in which a college fraternity hosted a
party and served alcohol to its guests. According to the court the
fraternity had reason to know that many of its guests would be
minors and that some of its guests would drive home after the
party." The plaintiff, a passenger in a car driven by a minor who
had become intoxicated at the party, was injured when the car col-
lided with a building.5 The Oregon Supreme Court found that the
fraternity, due to its status as host of the party, had a duty based
on common law negligence principles to refuse to serve alcohol to a
guest when under the circumstances, such as the guest being a mi-
nor, it would be unreasonable to permit him to drink.56 By breach-
ing its duty to the public to refrain from creating unreasonably
dangerous situations, the fraternity became liable for the torts
committed by its intoxicated minor guests.57
Seven years later the California Supreme Court addressed the
issue of social host liability in Coulter v. Superior Court.5 8 The
plaintiff in Coulter brought an action against the owner and man-
ager of an apartment complex who served excessive amounts of al-
cohol to an individual who then left the apartment complex intoxi-
cated.59 The individual subsequently injured the plaintiff in an
automobile collision. 0 The California Supreme Court noted that it
had long been a principle of law that a person is liable for the fore-
seeable injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care.'
Applying this principle of common law, the California Supreme
Court reasoned that one who serves alcoholic beverages to an obvi-
52. Id. at 532, 309 S.E.2d at 533.
53. 485 P.2d 18 (Or. 1971).
54. Id. at 20.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 23.
57. Id.
58. 577 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1978).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 674.
212 [Vol. 15:207
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ously intoxicated person 2 knowing that the intoxicated person in-
tends to drive a car creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury
to others on the highway, thus failing to exercise reasonable care.63
Therefore, the social host who provides the alcohol is liable for
foreseeable injuries caused by the intoxicated guest." Immediately
after the California Supreme Court issued this opinion, the Cali-
fornia Legislature reacted by passing a statute abrogating the hold-
ing in Coulter."
The highest court in New Jersey again tested the waters of
social host liability when it extended the liability of the social host
for the torts of his intoxicated adult guest in Kelly v. Gwinnell.6
In Kelly, defendant Donald Gwinnell, after driving dMfendant Jo-
seph Zak home, spent an hour or so at Zak's home having a few
drinks with Zak before returning home. 7 Zak had walked Gwinnell
back to his car and watched him drive away. 8 Instead of reaching
home safely, however, Gwinnell caused a head-on collision with
plaintiff Marie Kelly who was seriously injured. 9 The court found
significant that Gwinnell's blood alcohol level of 0.286 percent, al-
most three times the level necessary to find one guilty of driving
under the influence of alcohol.7 0 The court insisted that anyone
with such a high blood alcohol level would have been visibly intoxi-
cated.7 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a social host
who provides intoxicating liquor to an adult guest, knowing that
the guest is intoxicated and knowing that the guest will soon drive,
62. In contrast to the intoxicated person in the Wiener case, the intoxicated
person referred to in the Coulter case was an adult.
63. Coulter, 577 P.2d at 674.
64. Id. at 675-76.
65. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1982). The text of the
provision provides:
The legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so
that the holding in . . . Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577
P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978) be abrogated in favor of prior judicial
interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages as the
proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another be an intoxicated
person.
66. 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
67. Id. at 1220.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Under N.J.S.A. § 39:4-50 (1983), anyone who drives with a blood
alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more is guilty of driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor.
71. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1220 (N.J. 1984).
19931 213
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is liable for injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the guest if that negli-
gence is caused by the intoxication.7
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Kelly based the liability of
the social host on common law negligence principles. The court
started with the principle that "negligence is tested by whether the
reasonably prudent person at the time and place should recognize
and foresee an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or danger to
others. '73 The court added that a "tortfeasor is generally held an-
swerable for the injuries which result in the ordinary course of
events from his negligence and it is generally sufficient if his negli-
gent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the inju-
ries." 74 Applying the facts of the case to these principles, the court
found that a reasonable person in Zak's position could foresee that
continuing to serve alcohol to Gwinnell created an unreasonable
risk that Gwinnell would likely injure someone as a result of negli-
gent operation of his car.75 The court then asked whether it should
impose a duty to prevent such risks. 6 Insisting that something
"more" such as some value judgment was needed to impose a duty,
the court supplied the value judgment by citing the current social
goals of reducing drunk driving and compensating innocent victims
of drunk drivers.77 The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the
duty and held the host-tortfeasor answerable for the resulting
injuries.
Despite predictions78 that the New Jersey legislature would
abrogate the Kelly decision as the California legislature did with
Coulter,79 Kelly remains good law almost ten years later. Rather
than being a curiosity in New Jersey case law, the Kelly decision
has had a profound influence on courts in many jurisdictions that
have considered the social host question since 1984 and has
72. Id. at 1224.
73. Id. at 1221 (quoting Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (N.J. 1959)).
74. Id. (quoting Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1, 11 (N.J. 1959)).
75. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1222.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Stephen R. Thelin, Note, Torts - Negligence - Social Host Who
Serves Liquor to a Visibly Intoxicated Adult Guest Knowing that Guest Will
Thereafter Operate a Motor Vehicle May Be Held Liable For Injuries to Third
Parties Caused by Guest's Negligence, 89 DICK. L. REV. 537 (1985).
79. See supra note 65 (text of statutory abrogation).
214 [Vol. 15:207
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sparked a flurry of academic discussion on social host liability."0
Although all courts do not openly embrace the Kelly recognition of
common law social host liability,8 1 the case is not without its
followers.82
C. Positions On Social Host Liability Adopted in Other
Jurisdictions
The issue of social host liability has been addressed in almost
every jurisdiction in recent years.83 Although the responses
adopted have been varied, 4 the courts in most states have adopted
one of the following three positions or some variation of them. 5
1. Refusing to Impose Social Host Liability
Courts in several jurisdictions refuse to impose any liability on
the social host."6 The reason most often cited for the refusal to
80. See, e.g., Mark E. Cherry, Note, Social Host Liability Under the Com-
mon Law: Kelly v. Gwinnell, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 97 (1985); Deborah B. Goldberg,
Comment, Imposition of Liability on Social Hosts in Drunk Driving Cases: A
Judicial Response by Principles of Common Law and Common Sense, 69 MARQ.
L. REV. 251 (1986); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Comment, Recognizing the Liability
of Social Hosts Who Knowingly Allow Intoxicated Guests to Drive: Limits to
Socially Accepted Behavior, 60 WASH. L. REV. 389 (1985); LaDonna Hatton, Note,
Common Law Negligence Theory of Social Host Liability for Serving Alcohol to
Obviously Intoxicated Guests, 26 B.C.L. REV. 1249 (1985); James T.
Landenberger, Edward A. Murphy, Robert R. Orellana, Comment, Kelly v. Gwin-
nell: The Social Host and His Visibly Intoxicated Guests: Joint Liability for In-
juries to Third Parties and Proper Evidentiary Tests, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
191 (1984); Maura E. Mahon, Comment, Imposing Third Party Liability on So-
cial Hosts, 5 PACE L. REV. 80 (1985); Thelin, supra note 78; Lisa M. Waggoner,
Note, Social Host's Liability: No More "One for the Road" in New Jersey, 61
CHI. KENT L. REV. 165 (1985).
81. See, e.g., Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987); Holmquist v.
Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985); Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d 526 (Miss.
1985); Andres v. Alpha Kappa Lambda Fraternity, 730 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1987);
Conigliaro v. Franco, 122 A.D.2d 15 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Congigi v. Portersville
Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983); Burkhart v. Harrod, 755 P.2d 759 (Wash.
1988); Langle v. Kurkel, 510 A.2d 1301 (Vt. 1986).
82. Ashlock v. Norris, 475 N.E.2d 1167 (Ind. App. 1985); Clark v. Mincks, 364
N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985)(subsequently abrogated by statute); McGuiggan v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 144 (Mass. 1986).
83. See DiPadova supra note 7, at 392-97.
84. See infra notes 86-110 and accompanying text.
85. See DiPadova supra note 7, at 396-97.
86. For a survey of jurisdictions refusing to extend liability to a social host,
9
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impose social host liability is that "such a policy decision should be
made by the legislature after full investigation, debate and exami-
nation of the relative merits of the conflicting positions. '87 These
courts add support to their decision by emphasizing the social
host's lack of training and ability to recognize those who have con-
sumed too much alcohol, the social host's limited ability to control
intoxicated guests, and the social host's financial inability to pro-
tect himself adequately from the potential liability.8 Although the
courts, rather than the legislatures, have been the traditional lead-
ers in adapting and evolving the law to resolve new problems as
they arise,89 jurisdictions in which courts defer to the legislatures
on the social host liability issue must wait for the legislatures to
act and deprive injured plaintiffs of a potential cause of action.
2. Imposing Liability Based on Statutes
Some jurisdictions have imposed liability on social hosts
through the use of statutes.90 There are three ways in which liabil-
ity can be imposed by statute: dram shop acts, liquor control stat-
utes in conjunction with negligence per se theory, and by statutes
directly imposing the liability.91
The most difficult statute to use. to impose social host liability
is the Dram Shop Act. Dram shop acts are generally thought of as
statutes which impose liability on the seller of alcoholic beverages
when a third party is injured as a result of the intoxication of the
buyer where the sell of the alcohol has contributed to the intoxica-
see DiPadova, supra note 7, at 397 (listing Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, and Vermont).
87.. Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. 1985). Other courts ad-
hering to this policy include: Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987);
Miller v. Moran, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (Ill. App. 1981); Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d
526, (Miss. 1985); Andres v. Alpha Kappa Lambda Fraternity, 730 S.W.2d 547
(Mo. 1987); Conigliaro v. Franco, 504 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. 1986); Garren v. Cum-
mings & McGrady, Inc., 345 S.E.2d 508 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986); Burkhart v. Harrod,
755 P.2d 759 (Wash. 1988).
88. John O'Halloran, Social Host and Vendor Liability for Driving-Related
Injuries Caused by Intoxicated Guests and Customers, 1987 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
589, 605 (1987).
89. Note, Negligence - Social Host Liability - Social Hosts Not Liable For
Accidents Caused By Intoxicated Guests, 102 HARv. L. REV. 549, 555 (1988).
90. See DiPadova, supra note 7, at 392-95.
91. See, generally, Elizabeth A. Levin, Comment, The Liability of Social
Hosts for Their Intoxicated Guests' Automobile Accidents - An Extension of the
Law, 18 AKRON L. REV. 473 (1984-85).
[Vol. 15:207
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tion.92 Some creative courts have been able to construe broadly
worded statutes, such as ones prohibiting any person from provid-
ing alcohol to certain classes of people, as applying to social hosts
as well as commercial vendors.93 However, these efforts have been
short-lived due to legislative action making the legislative intent
not to impose social host liability crystal clear."'
The second use of statutes to impose social host liability is the
liquor control statute in conjunction with negligence per se theory.
Similar to the dram shop act mechanism for imposing liability, the
liquor control statute can be used to impose social host liability
where the statute is broadly worded to prohibit any person from
providing alcohol to a minor.9 5 Courts may adopt the duty imposed
by statute as the standard of conduct to which all reasonable men
must conform their acts for the protection of others against unrea-
sonable risks.9 A violation of such a public safety statute consti-
tutes negligence per se.9 I The disadvantage of imposing social host
liability on this mechanism is that most liquor control statutes
only prohibit providing alcohol to minors.9 8 Therefore, the social
host only has a duty to refrain from providing alcohol to minors,
making the social host liable for the torts committed by only minor
social guests and not those committed by adult social guests. As
with the dram shop act mechanism, the liquor control mechanism
runs the risk of being abolished through legislation.9
Finally, statutes may be used to directly impose civil liability
on the social host for the torts committed by their intoxicated
guests if the torts were, in fact, proximately caused by the intoxi-
cation. No legislature has yet enacted such statutes, although at
least two legislatures have allowed judicial construction of statutes
92. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 494 (6th ed. 1990).
93. See, e.g., Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972); Ross v.
Ross, 200 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1972).
94. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340.95 (West Supp. 1984).
95. See Levin, supra note 91, at 482.
96. Id. at 481 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965)).
97. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 36, at 229-30 (5th ed. 1984).
98. See Levin, supra note 91, at 482-84.
99. See, e.g., CA. CIVIL CODE § 1714 (West Supp. 1984).
1993]
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imposing social host liability to stand. 100
3. Imposing Liability Based on Common Law Negligence
Principles
In jurisdictions that lack any duty imposed by statute, the
duty may nonetheless be imposed by courts through the use of
common law negligence principles.0 1 The common law imposed a
duty on each person to exercise that degree of care which a reason-
able and prudent person would exercise under similar condi-
tions.10 Any person failing to exercise reasonable care is liable for
his negligence if the negligence is the proximate cause of injury to
another. 10
In the social host context, any host who serves alcohol to a
person that the host knew or should have known was under the
influence of alcohol and would subsequently drive an automobile
breaches his duty to exercise reasonable care because the host did
something a reasonable person would not do. 04 A reasonable and
prudent person would have known that allowing the guest to drink
and subsequently drive created an unreasonable degree of risk that
the intoxicated guest who injure himself or others if permitted to
drive. 10 Therefore, the social host becomes liable for the injuries
inflicted upon third parties by the intoxicated social guest that are
proximately caused by the social host's negligence.'
Some courts have adopted this position to extend social host
liability to the torts committed by the host's adult guests. 107 Other
courts have limited the liability to the torts committed by the
host's minor guests only, 0 believing that providing alcohol to the
minor guest creates an unreasonable degree of risk that the minor
guest would injure a third party because the minor, inexperienced
100. See DiPadova, supra note 7, at 373 (listing Georgia, which is limited to
minors, and Oregon).
101. See Levin, supra note 91 at 488.
102. Id.
103. Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 305, 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1992).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. For a survey of jurisdictions adopting this position, see DiPadova, supra
note 7 at 396 (listing the jurisdictions adopting this position as California, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Massachusetts, and New Jersey).
108. Id., (listing Georgia, Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin as states which
have adopted this position).
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in the effects of alcohol, lacks the necessary judgment to forego
driving after drinking alcohol. 109 These courts believe that adult
guests, being held responsible for their own actions, are able to ex-
ercise the necessary judgment and decide for themselves not to
drive after drinking alcohol. 110
ANALYSIS
Adhering to the national trend toward recognizing some form
of social host liability,"' the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Hart v. Ivey abandoned its prior policy of deference to the legisla-
ture" 2 and recognized social host liability based on common law
negligence principles."' The court articulated the new rule: a
plaintiff states a cognizable claim under common law principles of
negligence by alleging that the host-defendant served alcoholic
beverages to a person when the host knew or should have known
that the person was under the influence of alcohol and would drive
an automobile on the streets or highway shortly after consuming
the alcoholic beverage.'" Although the North Carolina Court of
Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court expressed a will-
ingness to recognize social host liability, the two courts disagreed
on the means to be used in reaching the result. In recognizing so-
cial host liability based on common law negligence principles, the
North Carolina, Supreme Court adopted an expansive rule for re-
covery for plaintiffs injured by drunk drivers, setting the stage for
further expansion.
A. The Dispute Between the Courts on the Means to Be
Employed
The plaintiffs in Hart v. Ivey asked the North Carolina Court
of Appeals to find social host liability based on common law negli-
gence principles and on a negligence per se theory.'" The court
109. See Odier, supra note 8 at 100.
110. Id.
111. See DiPadova, supra note 7 at 352.
112. Hart v. Ivey, 102 N.C. App. 583, 594, 403 S.E.2d 914, 921 (1991) (arguing
that the legislature did not intend to limit recovery in civil actions by enacting
the Dram Shop Act).
113. Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. at 299, 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992) (refusing recovery
based on negligence per se).
114. Id. at 305, 420 S.E.2d at 178.
115. Hart, 102 N.C. App. at 586, 403 S.E.2d at 916.
1993] 219
13
Shumate: The Recognition of Social Host Liability in North Carolina - Hart
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1993
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
summarily rejected the common law negligence rationale, stating
that:
A review of the common law of this State reveals no precedent for
the existence of such a cause of action. Our courts to date have
not articulated any common law duty existing between a third-
party furnishing alcohol to underage persons and the public at
large. This Court is therefore not prepared to establish any such
common law duty under the facts of this case." 6
However, the North Carolina Court of Appeals expressed its will-
ingness to impose a duty on the social host under the facts of the
case under a negligence per se theory.1 17
The plaintiffs based their negligence per se theory on N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 18B-302 (1983) which prohibits any person from aid-
ing a person under the age of nineteen (19) to purchase, obtain, or
possess alcoholic beverages. Characterizing the statute as a public
safety statute, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the
public policy and general purposes of the statute include: "(1) the
protection of the customer from adverse consequences of intoxica-
tion and (2) the protection of the community at large from the
injurious consequences of contact with an intoxicated person."118
Since 1955 it has been settled in North Carolina case law that
when a statute imposes a specific duty for the protection of others,
a violation of such a statute constitutes negligence per se. 119 Al-
though the defendants argued that the statute only applies to com-
mercial vendors and not to social hosts,12 0 the court was quick to
point out that the statute makes it unlawful for any person to sell
or give alcohol to a minor, making the statute applicable in the
social host situation."1
In sharp contrast, the North Carolina Supreme Court dis-
missed the negligence per se theory and embraced the common law
negligence principle theory. 122 The court stated that the N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 18B-302 is not a public safety statute because its purpose
is to stop minors from drinking alcoholic beverages rather than to
116. Id. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 921.
117. Id. at 593, 403 S.E.2d at 921.
118. Id. at 590, 403 S.E.2d at 919 (quoting Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C.
App. 1, 16, 303 S.E.2d 584, 593 (1983)).
119. Lutz Industries, Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 341, 88 S.E.2d
333, 339 (1955).
120. Hart, 102 N.C. App. at 586, 403 S.E.2d at 917.
121. Id. at 589, 403 S.E.2d at 918.
122. Hart, 332 N.C. at 304, 420 S.E.2d at 177.
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protect the public.1 23 The court reasoned that if the statute were a
public safety statute, it would apply to people over the legal drink-
ing age as well. 2 ' The court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding
that a violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-302 is not negligence per
se.
125
The North Carolina Supreme Court did, however, express a
willingness to impose liability on the social host under common law
negligence principles. Tracing the reasoning found in Kelly v.
Gwinnell, 26 the court recited that "[a]ctionable negligence is the
failure to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable and pru-
dent person would exercise in similar circumstances.' ' 27 In addi-
tion, the court acknowledged that "[t]he law imposes upon every
person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive
duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and
calls a violation of that duty negligence."' 28 Further, the "defend-
ant is liable for his negligence if the negligence is the proximate
cause of the injury to a person to whom the defendant is under a
duty to use reasonable care."' 29 Applying these principles of negli-
gence to the facts in Hart, the court concluded: that the defend-
ants were under a duty to the public to act as a reasonable person
would; that a reasonable person would not serve alcohol to a mi-
nor, knowing that the minor was intoxicated and would soon drive;
and that the reasonable person would have foreseen the injurious
results that did, in fact, occur.13°
B. Setting the Stage For Further Expansion
By finding social host liability under common law negligence
principles, the North Carolina Supreme Court has set the stage for
further expansion of the social host doctrine. The court is limited
by the facts of the Hart case to impose liability on a social host for
the torts of his minor guests, any suggestion of liability for the
torts of adult guests being mere dicta. The negligence per se the-
ory propounded by the North Carolina Court of Appeals was based
123. Id. at 303, 420 S.E.2d at 177.
124. Id. at 303-04, 420 S.E.2d at 177.
125. Id. at 304, 420 S.E.2d at 177.
126. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
127. Hart, 332 N.C. at 305, 420 S.E.2d at 177-78.
128. Id., 420 S.E.2d at 178 (quoting Council v. Dickerson's Inc., 233 N.C. 472,
474, 64 S.E.2d 551, 553 (1951)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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on a statute that prohibited any person from selling or giving alco-
hol to minors. Such a holding could not easily be expanded to
cover liability for the torts of adult guests because the social host
would be under no statutory duty to withhold alcohol from such a
guest. In contrast, the approach adopted by the North Carolina
Supreme Court is capable of expansion under the appropriate facts
to impose a duty on social hosts for the tort of their adult guests.
CONCLUSION
Following the national trend toward permitting recovery, the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Hart v. Ivey recognized social
host liability for the torts of one's intoxicated minor guest for the
first time in the state. The approach which the court decided to
adopt is the best choice available among the approaches adopted
in other jurisdictions.. The underpinnings of the approach are well
established principles of tort law. The extension of the principles
to reach the new holding are slight. As with any major change in
the application of common law principles, uncertainty is sure to
follow the decision for years. The possibility of legislative abroga-
tion looms everpresent. Test cases are apt to be thrust upon the
courts to determine whether the adopted approach is a hard and
fast limit imposed by the court, or whether the approach is merely
a step in the evolution toward even more expansive recovery for
plaintiffs injured by drunk drivers.
Donna L. Shumate
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